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The Re-imposition of Orthodoxy in Czechoslovakia 
STEPHEN R. BOW ERS 
Berry College 
Polish events since 1980 have raised again the question of the long-term 
prospects for a "liberalization" of the communist party regimes in Eastern 
Europe. The repression of Solidarity and its allied movements that began in 
December, 1981 seemed to confirm the negative hypothesis advanced by 
Jean-Francois Revel in The Totalitarian Temptation. Revel argues that 
There is to this day not one bit of evidence for the ... hope that 
communism will evolve toward democratic pluralism .... The distinc-
tive characteristic of communism, its very reason for being, is to 
eliminate the possibility of any challenge to its rule, thus to deny to the 
people ... any opportunity to change their minds once the regime is in 
power. ' 
Revel's view is not a new one. Soviet and East European specialists have 
long argued that repression is an essential feature of the communist regime. 
Ideological dictates, they have insisted, lead inevitably to party-state in-
terference in economics, art, literature, and even natural science, to name 
only a few areas of concern. Marxist-Leninist assumptions, of course, are 
based on the proposition that ideological errors-departures from ortho-
doxy in any endeavor-lead automatically to political disaster. Thus, 
repression of "error" is an official obligation. The nature of that repres-
sion, however, may vary greatly by time, nation, and regime. Repression 
need not be, as was often assumed in the past, capricious and unpredictable. 
Political repression, a modified form of the official terror of earlier 
times, is a normal course of events in Eastern Europe today. After decades 
of communist rule, it has become obvious that deviant behavior in some 
form will always be present in spite of party pledges to create the "new 
socialist man." This creates the possibility of political, social, cultural, or 
economic "error." The need to avoid the consequences of such mistakes 
necessitates at least a modest degree of repression. Where noticeable 
political or social disintegration has resulted from the commission of errors, 
an intensification of repressive measures will be apparent. However, it is 
important to note that official destructive violence is much less common in 
the Eastern Europe of the 1980's than was the case during the so-called 
"Stalinist" era. Repression has changed demonstrably since that violent 
epoch and takes the form of administrative measures more often than ar-
rests or outright physical brutality, although such actions are still numbered 
among the weapons of most Eastern European regimes. It is the ad-
ministrative devices that have been most valuable in the institutionalization 
of a non-destructive, silent repression. The fact that bureaucratic agencies 
responsible for mundane matters of daily existence can also serve as 
70 
repressive instruments makes possible the subtle integration of repression 
into the routine fabric of life. In this fashion, it can be directed-with vary-
ing intensity-against anyone who deviates from orthodoxy. In addition to 
this punitive function, repression has increasingly assumed a didactic pur-
pose in that the "audience" is perhaps more important than the victims of 
repressive actions, Thus, the over-all social impact of repression is just as 
crucial as the actual discouragement of deviant behavior. 
While most popular attention is focused on events in Poland at this 
time, a study of Eastern Europe's most recently completed treatment of 
deviation, the so-called "Czech Spring," and the thorough re-imposition of 
orthodoxy in the decade after Dubcek's brief tenure as First Secretary of the 
Czechoslovakian Communist Party is instructive for those who wish to 
understand the dynamics of political control in contemporary Eastern 
Europe. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the past decade's repres-
sion or "normalization" of Czechoslovakia and, where appropriate, com-
pare that process with similar events elsewhere in the region . Such a com-
parison is warranted, not only by the numerous common elements in the 
various regimes, but also by the countless invidious comparisons being 
drawn by the Czech authorities themselves in the wake of the Polish 
upheavals. 
The purpose of the Czechoslovakian normalization is to re-establish 
exclusive party control over events in that nation. Exclusive control is a fun-
damental requirement of an ideology that serves as the foundation for 
overall party policy. In the Marxist-Leninist system, ideology functions as 
religion and culture do in the non-socialist state by limiting the range of 
alternatives open in both collective and individual action. Because of its ex-
ceptional importance, ideology clearly requires protection and preservation 
in communist party states. During its decade of normalization, 
Czechoslovakia has taken the requirement to repress "error" most seriously 
with authorities identifying both institutions and philosophies thought to 
pose a danger to the official belief system of the regime. 
The process of normalization is based on a combination of coercion 
and consumerism. The regime endeavors to increase the available supply to 
consumer goods as a means of winning the support of the general population 
while utilizing sanctions against those who are unwilling to recognize the 
legitimacy of the system on the basis of its economic performance. Through 
most of the seventies there has been evidence of very real accomplishments 
in the consumer goods sector. During the decade, ownership of consumer 
durables such as washing machines and televisions rose dramatically, and car 
ownership per capita doubled. In March, 1980, Prime Minister Strougal 
reported that national income had risen 590Jo while industrial output was up 
by 750Jo.2 The tenacity and purpose of the effort, however, may be more 
impressive than the outcome. According to a Wharton report in 1981, 
Czechoslovakia's economic performance in 1979-hampered by un-
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favorable weather, bad harvests , and general mismanagement-was very 
poor, and the modest recovery in 1980 was not sufficient to compensate 
completely for earlier losses. In 1980, national income grew by 3%, and in-
dustrial production rose 3.2%, while agricultural output was climbing 6%. 
The country's nonsocialist trade deficit continued to decline in 1980-fall-
ing to about $425 million-but was projected to rise to $600 million for 
1981 and 1982. Even though Czechoslovakia's national debt stood at $3.7 
billion, it was still the second lowest in Eastern Europe. These im-
provements neither halted Czechoslovakia's growing dependence on the 
USSR for energy and raw material imports nor made up for the required 
50% increase in the prices of several consumer goods in July, 1979. In fact, 
in October of 1980 even Prime Minister Strougal acknowledged that the na-
tion's economic picture was somewhat clouded. In 1982, Rude Pravo 
reflected Strougal's concern in a page one commentary demanding further 
incentives to improve living standards and to increase the supply of attrac-
tive products on the domestic market. 3 Several weeks later, authorities 
released an analysis of citizen complaints received by governmental agencies 
which indicated that most popular concerns related directly to problems 
with shop supplies, services, and allocation of apartments.• Yet, these 
economic problems have not yet had a dramatic impact on the living stand-
ards of most Czech citizens. ' As long as this continues to be the case, the 
positive side of the party's normalization effort should support the overall 
objectives. 
The negative element of the Czech normalization campaign is directed 
against the church, an institution with the potential of resisting the party's 
reassertion of authority . The Polish crisis, of course, demonstrates the ex-
tent to which the church can become a dominant element in the political 
equation of even a communist party state. In an effort to avoid the Polish 
experience, Czech authorities have formulated a three-part policy toward 
the church. First, they accuse Western church organizations of hostility 
toward Marxism-Leninism and of attempting to convince citizens of 
socialist states that communism is "anti-human and anti-Christian." 
Second, party leaders suggest that there is a link between the Western 
organizations and the churches in Czechoslovakia. This connection serves 
to transform the church into a "retarding element" in Czech society and the 
only manifestation of an alien ideology still active in socialist society. Finally, 
party officials accuse church leaders of political unreliability. By 1979, 500 
of the country's 3,530 Catholic clergymen had been declared politically 
suspect and were forbidden to perform pastoral duties. 6 In 1981 official 
distrust led to the requirement that numerous church dignitaries take a vow 
of loyalty to the state if they wished to continue their religious work. 1 Ad-
mittedly spurred on by Polish development, Czech police have begun an ex-
tensive campaign against the so-called secret Catholic church in 
Czechoslovakia. This is a well organized group which, officials charge, is 
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cooperating with radical centers in the capitalist world that hope to weaken 
the leading role of the party. This unofficial church is composed not only of 
secretly ordained priests, secret converts and underground printing 
establishments, but also of representatives of the existing Catholic organiza-
tions who support illegal church activities. Early in 1981, police conducted a 
series of raids in various parts of the country in an effort to destroy unof-
ficial church groups. 8 Official policies over the years have always been 
basically hostile to all religious activities, and these recent endeavors are 
clearly intended to insure that the church does not become a viable social or 
political force. 
The church in the communist party state makes an attractive target 
because it represents a tangible, identifiable organized force capable of 
directing resistance to official dictates. It may become, as in the Polish case, 
an independent force commanding the allegiance of large numbers of peo-
ple. There are, however, numerous attitudes and philosophies, not em-
bodied in any organizational entity, which nevertheless represent a threat to 
the official ideology. In fact, any outlooks other than those demanded by 
Marxism-Leninism are threats because they retard accomplishment of 
party-designated tasks. Among the most notorious of these is a "petit 
bourgeois mentality," a malignancy denounced by every communist regime 
throughout the world. The Czechoslovakian definition of this attitude is 
very broad and encompasses almost any critic. A petit bourgeois person, 
party writers declare, "composes alarming and completely unfounded 
reports of calamities awaiting consumers, savers, and working people." He 
is, moreover, one who labors under the mistaken notion that socialism is a 
"consumer society set-up intended to cater to his wants as a consumer. " 9 
Revisionism is another ghost haunting the Husak regime, a dangerous 
philosophy which "brought the party and all society to the verge of 
catastrophy." The party daily, Rude Pravo, warns that there are still people 
who would like to "evoke and rekindle revisionist theories and "transfer 
elements of capitalism into socialism.;, Opportunism, a third threat cited in 
this category, is described as one of the "main dangers" for society because 
people either ignore it or do not realize the enormity of the threat it poses. 
Finally, nationalism, especially in Slovakia, is still another threat to the 
regime's ideology. There have been numerous incidents during the period of 
normalization, including at least one well-publicized trial, highlighting the 
persistence of nationalism in Slovakia. 
The problem of nationalism in Czechoslavokia provides an interesting 
contrast with the Polish and Hungarian situations. Nationalism is a strong 
unifying force in Poland, something which has persisted throughout 
numerous difficult epochs and has served as an element bringing the citizens 
of the nation together. Nationalism in Czechoslovakia, by contrast, has 
contributed to divisions within the country, and Slovak nationalism is 
regarded as an especially divisive factor. Official attacks on Slovak na-
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tionalism, therefore, find a receptive audience in much of Czechoslovakia 
whereas an attack on Polish nationalism from the Polish United Workers' 
Party might be regarded as a defiance of historical tradition. A comparison 
of the ethnic compositions of the two nations demonstrates the necessity for 
different approaches. As the table below shows, Poland enjoys a high 
degree of ethnic homogeneity with all but l.30Jo of its population, about 
500,000 people, in the dominant group while Czechoslovakia is divided be-
tween two large communities and several small ones. 




















Source: National Basic Intelligence Factbook, Washington, D.C.: Central 
Intelligence Agency, April, 1981 p. 47 and p. 160. 
While nationalistic dissonance has been the norm in Czechoslovakia, 
Poland has experienced a merger of creed and religion that gives it much in 
common with Hungary. Such a condition and the comparison that it en-
courages does not augur well for Poland. Hungarian nationalism, like the 
Polish variety, has been especially intense throughout recent centuries and 
has been characterized by a coincidence of religion and patriotic ferver. 
Although the communist regime established after World War Two regarded 
organized religion as a threat, authorities did not mount a determined 
"church-wrecking" campaign, and active churches continued to dot the 
Hungarian countryside. Oaths of allegiance to the state were required of 
many church officials, and leaders viewed as hostile to the regime, such as 
Cardinal Mindszenty, were the targets of active persecution. Nevertheless, 
the Hungarian church was generally accepted as part of the nation's history 
and numerous Hungarian Marxist scholars have attempted to formulate a 
concept of socialism compatible with Christianity. Consequently, religion is 
part of the national life of Hungary and strengthens the national patriotism 
condemned as a threat by so many communist party regimes. Religion in 
this predominantly Catholic country has underscored resistance to com-
munism and helped make possible the dramatic events of 1956. More 
recently this attitude of resistance has fostered the formation of an intellec-
tual opposition that has yet to develop a definite poUtical program. The first 
public act of this slowly emerging group came in 1977 when it sent a letter of 
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support to Czechoslovakian signers of Charter 77. It is interesting that while 
Czech and later Polish initiatives against party orthodoxy were inspired by 
elements of the Hungarian experiment of 1956, today the Hungarian in-
tellectual dissidents borrow from the Czechs and the Poles by establishing 
such things as "free universities" and committees to assist victims of ad-
ministrative persecution. 11 The persistence of nationalism in Hungary, 
Poland and other East European states is especially significant, because it 
demonstrates that a traditional force-nationalism-is often stronger than 
the scientific force presumably represented by Marxism-Leninism. The 
danger that it continues to pose for the party's monopoly of power is equally 
germane to an examination of what is being attempted by the party leader-
ship in Czechoslovakia. If the similarities in the Hungarian and Polish na-
tionalism lead to the brutal consequences experienced by the 
Hungarian reformers in 1956, the prospects for even a modicum of tranquility 
in the region will be severely reduced. Such an unhappy result would also 
have profound consequences for Soviet-East European relations 
throughout this decade. Czech critics of the Polish reformers are quick to 
charge that it is precisely these results which are being sought by NATO, the 
United States, and "the papists headed by the Pope himself." In I 981, 
Bratislava Pravda charged that a "clerical-nationalist" counterrevolution 
was underway in Poland and was being openly financed by international 
anti-communist forces. 12 
While Czech authorities shelter the official ideology from such hostile 
philosophies as those cited above, they give equal importance to protection 
from individuals attempting to erode the party's authority. Denunciations 
of "alien beliefs" without corresponding actions against those espousing 
such conceptions would obviously be inadequate to achieve the authorities' 
objectives. In order to insure that the standard litany against hostile beliefs 
is accompanied by effective steps against the apostles of those beliefs, a 
significant effort has been made to identify specific enemies of the regime. 
The emigre dissidents, frustratingly beyond the casual reach of Czech 
security forces, are the object of special fury. According to authorities, 
these people are enemies of all citizens of Czechoslovakia, elite as well as 
non-elite. They are pictured as engaging in "criminal activities" and 
"working against the interests of their own country .... " 13 Official treat-
ment of such emigres is an illustration of the calculability of contempory 
East European repression in that the regime's measures are directed 
primarily against that small portion of the population which has been 
blatantly exhibited its opposition. This group, however, may be growing 
since recent statements by Czech dissidents indicate that more and more of 
them feel that "exile represents our only hope to extricate ourselves from 
the position of inferior beings in which communism keeps us." 14 
It is the domestic opposition, however, which provides the best illustra-
tion of the operation of Czechoslovakia's non-violent repression. The most 
severe cnt1c1sms are directed against the intellectual component of the 
broad grouping of opposition forces . It was during the "Prague Spring," 
Federal Premier Lubomir Strougal charges, that the intellectuals "came out 
against socialism and its fundamental values" and worked for the "destruc-
tion of the political system." Strougal admits that this error "continues to 
influence" official policy toward the intelligentsia. '' Formation of Charter 
77, a group identified largely with Czech intellectuals, produced even more 
frenzied attacks on the intelligentsia. 16 The Charter sees itself as an informal 
association of people of widely differing convictions and does not present 
itself as a political opposition group. Official statements indicate that the 
regime does not accept this benign view and the party press not only 
describes the Charterists as " elitists" increasingly alienated from their 
fellow citizens but charges that one of the founders, Vaclav Havel, is a 
"tool of the Western news media" who collaborated with an American spy 
during he 1960s." 
Authorities have worked to cultivate the impression that oppositon to 
intellectual dissidents is not centered solely within the party but is in reality 
a broadly based popular movement. A 1975 radio commentary by Jaroslav 
Korinek, after describing the activities of those who are "blackening and 
disparaging the results of our peoples' selfless work," attempted to generate sup-
port for moves against intellectuals by warning that "even socialism cannot 
allow itself the luxury of tolerating the deliberate harming of society." 11 
Recently Czech intellectuals have echoed the feelings of the party concern-
ing the developments in Poland. Speakers at a 1981 meeting at Torum 
University spoke of rightwing revisionism and anti-socialist remarks in 
Poland today as resembling those espoused by their colleagues during the 
years of crisis in their own country. ' 9 In 1977, the deputy head of the Czech 
Trade Union Congress joined the chorus by declaring that the trade 
unionists didn't ac_cept lectures on human rights from those conspiring 
against socialism. 20 In preparation for the tenth anniversary of the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Czech news media emphasized the "mass 
opposition" of Czech citizens to Dubcek's regime as well as to the activities 
of the Charterists. Speaking on Radio Prague broadcast in 1981, one Czech 
worker asserted that some rightwing exponents in Czechoslovakia wanted 
to "exploit the trade unions" and "weaken the socialist community." He 
further stated that it was the duty of Czech workers to ''rebuff these attacks 
of reaction," and that the Polish workers to do likewise in their country.'' 
The people of Czechoslovakia, according to numerous official reports, were 
demanding that action be taken against those calling for changes in their 
country's political system. 2 2 The message of the media was quite clear: the 
broad masses, the Czech "audience," clearly accepts the message conveyed 
by the party's repressive efforts and see the would-be reformers as the class 
enemy. 
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While few would suggest that a union exists between intellectuals and 
workers in Czechoslovakia, there is considerable concern about the at-
titudes of this most important group, misgivings which are a product of 
reports that factories are suffering from a breakdown of labor discipline. 
While dissidents cite this as evidence of worker dissatisfaction with political 
conditions in Czechoslovakia, authorities are vigorously attacking the 
manifestations of poor discipline. One of the first indications of this effort 
was a 1973 amendment to the labor code intended to limit the consumption 
of alcohol at work. 23 Further, the party has complained about the poor quality 
of Czech merchandise and charging that workers over-estimate their own 
worth because of the national labor shortage. 24 The party does not limit 
itself to verbal rebukes alone and declares that those who fail will "draw the 
appropriate consequences from poor and inefficient work" as authorities 
"penalize the remuneration of refunds ... " 25 
Czech dissidents, of course, place a political interpretation on the 
workers' lack of discipline. Writing in the emigre journal Listy, Karel Honza 
insists that workers have "absolutely rejected all Bolsheviks, communists, 
and Husakists." Numerous factory militias, he says, have been disbanded 
because of a shortage of reliable cadres and party organizations in factories 
are experiencing sharp drops in membership. According to Honza, the only 
luxury enjoyed by workers is the joy of loafing on the job or the privilege of 
sneaking off to perform extra jobs elsewhere to supplement salaries received 
at the factory. 26 The appearance of workers' names on Charter 77 is another 
indication that there might be some substance to dissident claims of worker 
support for demands expressed by intellectuals. 
Merely citing the philosophies and groups which the Husak regime 
regards as enemies does not provide a complete picture of the actions 
directed against real or potential oppositional centers. A full account of the 
party's policy regarding this matter allows us to see the extent to which of-
ficials are willing to go in reclaiming their monopoly of power. If the 
1960's, culminating with Dubcek's ascendency within the party, were a time 
of gradual erosion of the regime's absolute monopoly, the 1970's were an 
epoch of systematic reassertion of that authority. While there have been 
some questions regarding the role of many workers during this time, it is the 
intelligentsia-artists, writers, teachers, and scientists-who have borne the 
brunt of the party's attack. Anti-intellectual attitudes, of course, were com-
mon in the early communist years and later became institutionalized. 
However, in the era of normalization, they have become almost compulsory. 
Jeri Pelikan has described the anti-intellectualism of Husak's 
Czechoslovakia in Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe and outlines the 
far-reaching effects of this element of the nation's silent repression. Declar-
ing the Czechoslovakian case to be an example of a revolution which has 
"eaten its own children," Pelikan discusses the fates of the almost 500,000 
communists driven from the party following Gustav Husak's elevation to 
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Dubcek's position. These disillusioned people did not generally become 
targets of outright terror, but were usually subjected to political measures 
and material pressures. This restrained approach helped accomplish the 
regime's primary objective, consolidation of its political power, without 
stimulating more intense opposition to the process of normalization. 21 The 
avoidance of destructive force does not mean that at a later time it cannot 
be applied selectively or, if necessary, even widely. In exercising restraint 
authorities are simply using good judgement rather than sacrificing any of 
their numerous repressive powers. 
The stage was set for the 'purification' of the Party at a meeting of the 
Party Control Commission in 1975 with a call for the Party "to be more 
demanding" of its membership and to improve members' discipline and 
education. 28 Even before this formal statement there were demands in the 
press for an improvement in the quality of Party membership and for 
elimination of members who were unenergetic, opportunistic, or inclined 
toward "individualistic behavior." For those who view the process as 
routine, one party journal cautioned that this continuing effort is not "a 
mere administrative exercise. " 24 
Removal from the ranks of the Party is not the only bureaucratic sanc-
tion applied to those offensive to authorities. Several cases will illustrate 
other methods used against such individuals. Cestmir Cisar, for example, 
former Party secretary for Brno, was forced into a subordinate position in 
the Prague office for the care of monuments. The Prime Minister from 
Dubcek's era, Oldrich Cernik, was assigned a position as director of a coal 
supply operation while Central Committee member Milan Silhan became a 
bulldozer driver in South Bohemia. Two other prominent figures from the 
Prague Spring, Presidium member Dr. Zdenek Mlynar and Major General 
Vaclav Prohlik, a close Dubcek associate, suffered similar fates. Mlynar 
became an entomologist at the National Museum and Prohlik found 
employment as an underground construction worker. 30 
Writers have been the targets of other material pressures brought to 
bear against opposition elements. Dilia, the state copyright agency, is the 
primary bureaucratic instrument used to deny writers the opportunity of 
publishing their works, either at home or abroad. Dilia's utility as an agency 
of nondestructive repression was illustrated by its denial of permission for 
playright Pavel Kohout to publish his works in Czechoslovakia or West 
Germany where his former publisher had arranged for several of his plays 
to be performed. 3' Kohout's case, of course, was by no means exceptional 
and as Dilia's efforts have been supplemented by purges from the member-
ship of the Union of Czechoslovak: Writers, many writers find themselves 
without an outlet for their work. In a nine year period following the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the membership of the writers' organization 
declined from about 400 to 164, indicating that more and more writers are 
effectively eliminated from producing for the public. Similar pressures have 
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been applied within the Slovak Writers' Union which expelled Hana 
Ponicka, the well-known author of numerous childrens' books, and a fre-
quent regime critic, declaring that she would be forbidden to publish 
anything. 32 Further, the authorities recognize the importance of com-
munication among dissidents and attempt to restrict their ability to keep in 
touch with each other. This is true not only for those at home, who fre-
quently find phones disconnected and driver's licenses revoked, but also for 
those with links abroad. Not only has the Czechoslovakian repression been 
relatively silent, it has produced, for some people, silence. 
These actions are designed not simply to insure that the general public 
is unable to read literature that might be critical of the regime, but are also 
intended as punishments for creative people who refuse to use their talents 
to echo official policy. Punishment rather than censorship was clearly the 
motive when the popsinger Marta Kubisova was denied the right to perform 
following the appearance of her signature on a Charter 77 document. State 
security officals implied she would be allowed to sing again only if she 
withdrew her support for the petition. 33 The broad cultural impact of nor-
malization was demonstrated by the fact that of the 6,000 pop musicians 
registered in Czechosloviakia, only 3,000 were being allowed to give 
performances by 1978. 34 There is, of course, an additional motive in such 
measures since they serve as a lesson for other talented people who do not 
wish to see their professional ambitions frustrated because of "political 
shortcomings.'' 
Deprivation of citizenship is another administrative device used to 
punish as well as intimidate. When Pavel Kohout was denied permission to 
produce his plays, many expected that he would travel to West Germany in 
violation of the ban. However, had he done so, he could have been deprived 
of his citizenship in absentia. Later, he was allowed to go to Austria where 
he stayed for almost a year with assurance that he could return when he 
wanted to do so. However, when Kohout tried to return in 1979, be found 
that he was barred from the country and stripped of his citizenship. This 
threat can severely limit the options of dissidents who, like former Central 
Committee Secretary Zdenek Mlynar and historian Jan Tesar, find 
themselves without employment at home may wish to take a job abroad. 
Authorities threatened them with loss of citizenship if they chose to leave 
the country in spite of the fact that they were unable to work at home. 
Tesar's case was especially acute since he was ill but receiving none of the 
state aid to which he was entitled. 35 Some deprivations of citizenship are 
more abrupt. In 1980, dissident script writer Jiri Polak, a son of Alexander 
Dubcek's colleague, Ota Sik, was unceremoniously expelled from the coun-
try, along with his wife and son, and stripped of his citizenship. 36 
The security forces also practice methods which are not traditional in 
their application to East European Dissidents and associated with the more 
conventional forms of repression. Homes are invaded by policemen at in-
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convenient and unanticipated hours, manuscripts are confiscated and 
surveillance is constant. Imprisonment frequently results from these efforts 
to suppress opposition. Shortly after the appearance of Charter 77, a 
number of individuals associated with it were placed under house arrest. 
Apparently authorities resorted to this modified, restrained form of arrest 
simply in hopes of preventing dissidents from making contact with people 
who could publicize their complaints, especially during the conference of 
West European communists on "Problems of Peace and Socialism" in 
1977. 37 In 1981, twelve Charter 77 members, including former Foreign 
Minister Jiri Hayek were arrested and charged with subversion. Four, in-
cluding Hayek, were released on bail, but the other eight were accused of 
"serious foreign-backed subversive activities" and face jail sentences of up 
to ten years. These arrests were a continuance of the attacks against Charter 
77 members which heightened in 1981. 38 Many others followed, of course, 
and were not restricted to house arrests. In April, 1982, Anna Marvanova, 
spokeswoman for Charter 77, was taken into police custody and charged 
with "incitement to rebellion" while several other charter activists were be-
ing hunted by police with orders for their arrest. 39 The arrests themselves 
and the imprisonment that followed have often been accompanied by con-
siderable brutality. The historian Jan Tesar, for example, reported that 
while he was in prison he was brutally beaten and Jan Patocka, an interna-
tionally respected non-Marxist philosopher, died from a cerebral hemor-
rhage following his eleven hour interrogation in March, 1977. •0 In Pro-
fessor Patocka's memory, dissidents organized an underground study 
group known as the "Jan Patocka University." A series of police raids have 
been launched against this small, informal group and in 1979, for the first 
time, authorities arrested one of the numerous visiting Western academics, 
Norwegian economics professor Thorolf Rafto. •• Efforts to crush the 
"university," an intellectual outlet for young people denied admission to 
formal universities because of the political shortcomings, continued into 
1980. Several Western scholars, including philosopher Dr. Anthony Kenny, 
Master of Balliol College, Oxford, have been detained along with dozens of 
Czech citizens. Although these detentions have been accompanied by fre-
quent brutality, such as that applied to the philosopher Julius Tomin who 
on at least two occasions has been apprehended by police for attempting to 
lecture on Aristotle. There have usually been no formal charges or extended 
imprisonment resulting from the actions. •2 
When trials and imprisonment do follow arrests, the victims do not 
always recieve only the traditional confinement. Zcenek Kastak, for exam-
ple, charged with "anti-state incitement" when he wrote complaints to 
several newspapers, was sentenced to ten months in jail to be followed by an 
indefinite period of psychiatric care. •1 Nor are the charges necessarily tradi-
tional. Several Charterists received prison sentences of up to two years simply 
for disseminating recordings of a dissident musical group known as "The 
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Plastic People of the Universe.,, .. 
The general popular reaction to this assortment of repressive measures 
has been silence. During a time when their Polish comrades were 
experimenting with negotiation, cooperation, debates, confrontations, and, 
finally, counterattack, the leadership of the Czechoslovakian Communist 
Party was successfully isolating the dissidents from the people the dissidents 
believed they could help. The success of the Czech leadership must, in part, 
be attributed to the positive aspect of the normalization campaign-the ef-
fort to provide adequate economic compensations for the population. 
Though the Czech economy is not the best in Eastern Europe, its problems 
have not had a dramatic negative impact of the living conditions of the 
workers. While there are increasingly frequent denunciations of "rampant 
economic criminality" in Czechoslovakia, there are few of the devastating 
shortages and inconveniences seen in Poland. •5 The consumerist aspect of 
normalization has been sufficient to deprive dissidents of an automatically 
receptive audience. 
The non-destructive nature of the coercive element of normalization is 
yet another factor that must be taken into account in understanding the 
defeat of the Czechoslovakian dissidents. First, the targets of repression 
were usually intellectuals without extensive popular contacts. Except for the 
apparently widespread problem of poor worker discipline, there is limited 
evidence that the dissidents can cite to support their arguments that the 
workers share their aspirations for a renewal of the reforms started by Alex-
ander Dubcek in 1968. Second, the novelty and sophistication of the 
repressive methods has discouraged the making of effective martyrs. The 
declaration that a rebellious writer's home is an historic site that should be 
maintained by the state and not used as a private residence certainly makes 
life difficult for the writer, but it does not evoke the popular sympathy that 
imprisonment or execution would elicit. Confinement for psychiatric treat-
ment is a common practice, but the sad figures who emerge after such 
treatments are incapable of providing inspiring leadership. Less common 
but more unique was Pavel Kohout's detention for treatment of a human 
strain of "hoof and mouth disease." 
Finally, it is necessary to note the Soviet role in the process of nor-
malization. The fact of a Soviet invasion in 1968 underscored the futility of 
large-scale resistance. Since the time of the intervention, the USSR has 
played a more restrained role but has continued to exhibit great concern for 
official treament of Czech dissidents. High level support, apparently 
directed by the late Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Aleksei Kosygin, 
has been applied to insure the dominance of moderate factions committed 
to pursuit of non-destructive repression that avoids actions that could 
arouse sympathy for dissidents. 46 Because the Czechoslovakian situation 
allowed discreet coordination of Soviet and Czech efforts, the Soviet Union 
itself did not become an issue during the normalization process. By con-
81 
trast, a variety of factors made the USSR a point of contention between 
reformers and authorities in Poland and thus served to destabilize Polish 
politics in recent years. This situation, coupled with the isolation of the 
small number of dissidents from the broad spectrum of the industrial work-
ing population, enabled authorities to avoid the explosive combination of 
elements accumulating in Poland during this time. Consequently, while or-
thodoxy was steadily eroded in Poland, it was quietly re-imposed and the 
party's authority re-established in Czechoslovakia. 
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